MALI
Modern Mali, much like Chad, underwent a period of French colonial rule from the 1890s, ending June 20, 1960 with Malian independence. Mali’s pre-colonial history is illustrious. The region that became modern-day Mali was the central hub for African culture from around 1200 to 1400 CE and is the origin of many of the music and dance traditions of West Africa.60 Mali is a country of rich cultural diversity that multiple cultural identities “strengthened by a long history of cohabitation, conflict, and exchanges of all sorts – matrimonial, commercial, or simply that of neighbors.”61
Much like in Chad, the French found the costs of administering a colonial enterprise in Mali outweighed the benefits given the “largely uninhabitable and resource-devoid territory.”62 Thus the French “continued to administer it [Mali] without enthusiasm or any attempt to develop the area.”63 There was an effort by the French in the 1930s to cultivate the Niger River Valley in order to increase the export-based cotton industry to support the French textiles industry.64 The French embarked upon an irrigation scheme in the Niger River valley under the auspices of the Office du Niger which displaced families through flooding and established colonial villages where locals were forced to work on the plantations in a system of slave labor.65
Upon independence, Mali’s new leaders took a socialist path towards economic development and decolonization. Because the country was primarily agrarian entering independence, after independence the trajectory of development did not significantly change. The colonial enterprises of cotton and groundnuts remained central to the agricultural plan.66 Between 1960 and 1968 under the leadership of President Modibo Kéita and with French technical assistance, Mali adopted a central planning process that focused on industrialization, health, education, and social welfare policies aimed at helping the people.67 Kéita understood that economic investment was essential, but economic decisions were not separate from decolonization issues. Bingen points out that,
The central political issue was not whether the government should direct the economy, but which specific measures to use to achieve economic decolonization and economic independence from the French commercial monopolies.68
In this political and economic context, agricultural growth continued throughout the 60s and into the 70s. During the 60s and 70s cotton production increased at about 12% per year and69 despite flaws in its economic system, Mali was self-sufficient in the production of cereals until 1972-74.70 While many criticize Mali’s centralized planning and the lack of incentives for farmers for the downturn in grain production, it would seem that other factors intervened to make grain production difficult. Specifically, in the 70s Mali was subjected to severe drought which resulting in a national food crisis requiring massive donor aid.71
While Kéita was responsible for some economic decolonization, his rule was also contingent on political repression and the confiscation of grains by party elites. Ultimately, these practices led to a military-led coup in November of 1968. General Moussa Traoré who assumed power was not much better than Kéita. He suppressed the population, forcing many intellectuals into exile in Senegal or France and under his rule economic conditions did not improve. Despite the obvious problems with Traoré’s dictatorial rule, Cold War politics and the distinct lack of a better alternative meant that no efforts were made to alter the political leadership.72
Traoré ultimately sought economic help from the international community. In 1981 he agreed to restructure the economy in return for aid.73 Mali, in fact, became the “test case” for structural adjustment.74 However, despite some economic liberalization as a result of structural adjustment, the combination of political repression and economic debt brought the Traoré regime to an end when he responded violently to politically-motivated riots. In March 1991, riots broke out and were violently squashed by the Traoré regime. On March 26, 1991, Traoré was arrested and Lt. Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré took power.75
Political resistance to the Traoré regime was in part facilitated by the cultural organization Jamana founded by Dr. Alpha Oumar Konaré. Jamana was
[A] highly successful cultural cooperative which sponsored forums, festivals, publications, and literacy programs. The cooperative also established museum-documentation centers, craft workshops, and independent printing and publishing company, and Mali’s first private radio station.”76
Jamana served the purpose of creating the space for a subtle political critique and because it was not a political party it was able to exist under the repressive conditions of the Traoré regime.
Lt. Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré took power under a military regime but was responsible for transitioning the Malian government to democracy. The first democratically elected President of Mali was Dr. Alpha Oumar Konaré. Since democratization, political conditions in Mali have improved, but the massive debt load makes it unlikely that Mali will be able to pay off its debts without international intervention. As Andrew Clark puts it, “even by West African standards, Mali is desperately and perhaps perpetually poor.77 Average incomes in Mali remain around $250/year and adult literacy is very low.
Much like the case in Chad, it is unclear what, if any, benefit Mali can claim from membership in WIPO. Mali joined WIPO in 1982 and it seems most likely that their membership was one of the terms associated with structural adjustment. Since joining, WIPO has held meetings in Mali to educate the intellectual property elite about the concepts, but otherwise, there is not significant evidence of what WIPO has done in the country. However, it is the pre-1982 period that is of most interest given that the twelve years between Chad’s membership in WIPO and Mali’s membership are of most relevance to the impact WIPO may have had on development in Chad. What do these two case studies tell us?
First, there is no clear link between culture in Mali and Chad and the protection of intellectual property. Both countries have vibrant indigenous cultures with music and dancing traditions that date centuries prior to French colonization. Both countries relied upon these cultural traditions during the decolonization process to highlight a uniquely African identity, but cultural innovation was not motivated by intellectual property. Instead it precedes it. There is the possibility of making the argument today that copyright may play a role in African cultures given the rising popularity of world music in the West and the techniques of appropriation associated with the music industry. However, nothing would suggest that Chad’s twelve year start at protecting copyrighted works has altered protection in that country or facilitated their relationship to world music.
Second, poverty reduction should be the most important goal in Chad and Mali. Mali suffered from a food crisis during the 70s and despite WIPO membership, Chad remained equally poor during that decade. Membership in WIPO did not alter these facts. In fact, such membership is doomed inevitably to failure because so many more important intervening variables exist – mass starvation, civil unrest, and inadequate infrastructure of every kind. What would have helped development in both countries would have been access to knowledge in the form of textbooks and appropriate technologies along with the appropriate resources to implement these from the ground up. Instead, because of cold war politics and reliance upon top-down international institutions, no such aid was forthcoming.
Third, sponsoring conferences and workshops in the host countries are not enough to change conditions on the ground. In both Chad and Mali, WIPO has sponsored workshops, albeit only in the last decade. However, despite the fact that WIPO measures its success in terms of number of people who have heard its message, there is no evidence that building intellectual property bureaucracies have made any difference in either country. Additionally, there is evidence that both countries began from radically different notions of property rights and the contributions of the individual to the community – a system based far less on the individual than the intellectual property system that has since been imposed.
These considerations lead to the conclusion that WIPO has neither been necessary nor sufficient for economic development in Chad or Mali. Outside the very small offices listed at WIPO’s website as points of contact, it isn’t even clear what type of impact these offices may have. However, WIPO itself could be different. In the final section of the paper I’d like to turn a second WIPO ‘what if’ – what if WIPO took the mission of facilitating development seriously.
